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This paper incorporates morality—defined as lower 
utility from consuming goods obtained through 
appropriative rather than productive activities—into a 
simple static general equilibrium model in which agents 
choose whether to be producers or appropriators. The 
authors analyze the relationship between the correlation 
between morality and human capital on the one hand, 
and aggregate economic performance on the other. 
They show that there is a main effect that tends to cause 
this relationship to be positive, and that there can be 
secondary effects that can either rein-force or oppose (or 
even overbalance) the main effect. They test the theory 
using the World Val-ues Survey as a source of proxies for 
morality. Using their preferred proxy, they find evidence 
This paper is a product of the Human Development and Public Services Team, Development Research Group. It is part 
of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy 
discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. 
The authors may be contacted at sknack@worldbank.org or dbalan@ftc.gov.  
that higher within-country correlation between morality 
and ability, holding constant the levels of morality and 
ability, increases per-capita income levels. Under the 
preferred specification, a one-standard-deviation increase 
in the correlation between morality and ability raises 
the log of per-capita income by about one-fourth of a 
standard deviation, equal to approximately $3,600 for 
the median income country in the sample. The results 
are robust to correcting for endogeneity and to changes 
in sample and specification. The results are mixed when 
the analysis uses alternative morality proxies, but the 
coefficient on the morality-ability correlation is still 
usually positive and statistically significant. 
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I. Introduction 
Some economic activities are productive, while others are appropriative. The performance of 
an economy is affected by the choices that agents make about whether they prefer to be produc-
ers or appropriators. These choices are influenced by the human capital endowments of econom-
ic agents (hereafter referred to as “ability”), and can also be influenced by the “morality” of 
agents, which we define as an aversion to consuming appropriated goods.
1 In this paper we ex-
amine the economic effects of cross -country differences in the within -country correlation be-
tween morality and ability, holding the aggregate levels of morality and ability constant.
2 Put 
another way, this paper is about whether and how a country’s economic performance changes 
when the moral people in the economy are more likely also to be the talented people. 
To see the main result of the model, imagine two countries, both with the same total morality 
and ability. Country A is dominated by a corrupt aristocracy, whose members tend to have high 
ability (they were sent to the best schools), but low morality (they were raised either not to notice 
that their activities are appropriative or not to care). Country B, in contrast, is dominated by a 
benevolent aristocracy, whose members also have high ability, but who are educated to have a 
sense of “noblesse oblige.” That is, in Country A there is a low or negative correlation between 
morality and ability, whereas in Country B there is a strongly positive one. 
                                                 
1 Economists have traditionally been wary of assuming that tastes (such as a taste for morality) vary across individu-
als, preferring to assume that tastes are homogeneous and to explain differences in outcomes as the result of differ-
ences in endowments, incentives, or constraints (Stigler and Becker, 1977). Naturally, an explanation based on hete-
rogeneity of tastes is more justifiable (all else equal) the more firmly it is established empirically that tastes do in 
fact vary in the relevant ways. Caplan (2003) summarizes the psychology literature on this point, which appears to 
confirm that personalities can be categorized into distinct types, and that these types differ from each other signifi-
cantly. Of particular importance for the present paper is the finding that, all else equal, criminals tend to have lower 
levels of certain personality factors than do other people. This is consistent with the common sense notion that some 
people are more moral than others, and lends support to the approach taken in this paper. 
2 It is trivial to show that performance is always increasing in the level of morality. The model also generates results 
regarding the effect of changes in the level of human capital, but discussion of this is confined to footnote 9 below.   3 
Now consider what would happen if Country A became more like Country B. Some high-
ability agents would be changed from low to high morality, and an equal number of low-ability 
agents would be changed from high to low morality. Any high-ability agent who was already a 
producer will remain a producer, so the increase in morality will have no effect. But those high-
ability agents that started out as appropriators will get less utility from appropriation than before, 
which will cause some of them to switch and become producers. The effect on the low-ability 
agents will be the opposite, those that were already appropriators will remain appropriators, and 
some producers will switch and become appropriators. 
Increasing the correlation between morality and ability causes some high-ability agents to 
switch into being producers, and causes some low-ability agents to switch out of being produc-
ers. This tends to cause the total amount of ability employed in productive activity to increase, 
which improves economic performance. This can be thought of as the “main” effect in our mod-
el, and it is larger the greater the difference in ability between high and low ability agents.  
But the fact that the number of agents changed from high to low morality is equal to the num-
ber changed from low to high morality does not necessarily mean that the number of switchers 
from appropriation to production will be equal to the number of switchers from production to 
appropriation, or that the switchers in each direction will be identical in other relevant respects. 
These differences can generate secondary effects that can reinforce or oppose, and can even on 
net overbalance, the main effect. 
  The thought experiment in the model involves increasing the correlation between morality 
and ability within a country. But the same reasoning can be applied to cross-country compari-
sons. All else equal, the effect of increasing the correlation between morality and ability within a 
country is the same as the difference between the performances of countries with corresponding-  4 
ly  different  correlations.  The  model  predicts  either  an  empirical  finding  that  higher  within-
country correlation between morality and ability (controlling for the levels of both) has a positive 
effect on economic performance in a cross-country regression, or that over the relevant range the 
sector choices of high-ability agents are much less sensitive to morality than those of low-ability 
agents. We test the theory using the World Values Survey as a source of proxies for morality and 
borrowing the regression framework of Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004). We show that 
higher within-country correlation between morality and ability, holding constant the levels of 
morality and ability, increases per capita income levels. This effect is both robust and of a sub-
stantial  magnitude: using our preferred proxy  and specification, a one-standard-deviation in-
crease in the correlation raises the log of per-capita income by about one-fourth of a standard 
deviation, equal to approximately $3600 for the median-income country in our sample. 
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II summarizes the relevant litera-
ture on morality (as we define it in this paper) and on the importance of how talent is allocated 
between productive and appropriative economic activities. Section III lays out our model and 
derives our theoretical results. Section IV contains our empirical results, including analysis of 
causality  (that  the  morality-ability  correlation  causes  high  incomes  and  not  the  other  way 
around), and of the robustness of the results to using alternative proxies for morality. Section V 
contains discussion and conclusions. 
 
II. Previous Literature 
A. Morality 
For this paper to have relevance, it must be the case that at least some agents are willing to 
sacrifice income in order to do work that they regard as more moral. Casual empiricism suggests   5 
that this is the case, though the question has received little formal study. The only directly rele-
vant paper of which we are aware is by Frank (1996), who uses a number of datasets to show that 
people do indeed sacrifice very significant amounts of income to work in more moral jobs.  
  In modern societies where fertility decisions are not based primarily on the availability of 
basic necessities, it is possible for morality to persist in equilibrium, and to be inculcated in oth-
ers, even though on average it reduces the moral agents’ consumption. If morality can be incul-
cated, then the level and distribution of morality may be something that can be influenced by 
policy. Two papers that examine the inculcation of morality are Guttman, Nitzan and Spiegel 
(1992) and Francois and Zabojnik (2005). 
 
B. Choice between Production and Appropriation  
There are a number of papers that explore the causes of cross-country differences in the allo-
cation of talent between production and appropriation. In some of these papers (Baumol, 1990; 
Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, 1991), cross-country differences in the allocation of talent, and the 
resulting differences in economic performance, arise due to exogenous variation in technology 
and in the institutional environment. Other papers (Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Acemog-
lu,  1995)  develop  representative-agent  models  in  which  there  are  no  exogenous  differences 
across economies, but in which differences in economic performance still arise because the mod-
els have multiple equilibria. The present paper is more in the spirit of the former group of mod-
els; there are no multiple equilibria, and differences in cross-country performance arise due to 
exogenous differences in the model parameters.   6 
 In Grossman and Kim (2000), as in our paper, the choice between production and appropria-
tion is influenced by morality.
3 In their model higher morality improves economic performance, 
and the level of morality evolves dynamically over time, with alternating periods of moral decay 
and moral “revivals.” In their model, however, agents vary only in their level of morality. Our 
paper, in contrast, focuses on the interaction between morality and ability. 
 
III. The Model 
A. Endowments and Sector Choice 
We assume a unit mass of atomistic agents. Each agent is endowed with general ability aj 
which can be high or low (aH or aL), and with morality mk (defined below), which can also be 
high or low (mH or mL). There are four types of agents, and all agents of a given type jk have the 
same ability and the same morality. The types are summarized as follows. 
 
  mL  mH 
aL  Type LL  Type LH 
aH  Type HL  Type HH 
 
The economy has two sectors: “productive” and “appropriative.” Agents in the productive 
sector produce a consumption good (food), and agents in the appropriative sector produce an 
item that is used to effect a transfer of food from producers to themselves (crowbars for prying 
open locked granaries). Each agent joins one of the two sectors. There is no money, exchange, or 
joint production and there are no firms or institutions. 
                                                 
3 There are a few other papers in broadly the same spirit. Aidt (2003) develops a model in which some honest bu-
reaucrats refuse to accept bribes on principle. Noe and Rebello (1994) develop a model in which some “ethical” firm 
managers regard it as their duty to exert high effort even when monetary incentives are absent.    7 
The maximum amount of food that an agent of ability aj can produce is p(aj). Each agent i is 
endowed with an idiosyncratic εi, distributed according to f() on [0,1], which captures his or her 
level of productive sector talent, represented as the fraction of p(aj) that he or she is capable of 
producing. Similarly, the maximum number of crowbars that an agent of ability aj can produce is 
r(aj), and each agent is endowed with a similarly defined idiosyncratic talent ηi, independently 
distributed according to g() on [0,1]. 
An agent i of ability aj who joins the productive sector makes εip(aj) units of food. Of this, she 
consumes αεip(aj) units, where α  (0,1) is an (endogenous) parameter representing the fraction 
of food output that is not lost to appropriators. The utility received by an agent i of ability aj who 
joins the productive sector is equal to: 
(1a)  ( , ) ( )
p
ij j i i j u a p a     
Morality does not appear in (1a), because participation in the productive sector is not regarded as 
immoral, and so morality does not influence the utility received in that sector. 
An agent of ability aj who joins the appropriative sector makes ηir(aj) crowbars, and con-
sumes βηir(aj) units of food, where β  0 is an (endogenous) parameter which represents the 
amount of food that an appropriator can seize with each crowbar. The utility received by an 
agent i of ability aj and morality mk who joins the appropriative sector is equal to: 
(1b)  ( , , ) (1 ) ( )
r
ijk j k i k i j u a m m r a     
The utility from joining the appropriative sector is equal to food consumption minus the psychic 
cost associated with earning one’s living through appropriation. An agent for whom m = 0 is per-
fectly amoral, as his utility depends solely on food consumption. An agent for whom m = 1 is 
perfectly moral, as he receives no utility from participating in the appropriative sector.   8 
An agent i of ability aj and morality mk chooses the productive sector if:  
(2)
(1 )[ ( )/ ( )]
( , ) ( , , ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
k j j pr i
ij j i ijk j k i i j k i j i jk
i
m r a p a
u a u a m p a m r a z T





         
For each of the four types, there is a unique threshold level of the ratio εi/ηi  zi such that an 
agent characterized by that level is indifferent between the two sectors. We refer to these thre-
sholds as Tjk. The ratio zi is distributed according to h() with support [ , ] zz. 
 
B. Sector Output Functions 
Total food output in the economy P is equal to: 
 (3)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
LL LH HL HH
z z z z
LL i L i i LH i L i i HL i H i i HH i H i i
T T T T
P p a h z dz p a h z dz p a h z dz p a h z dz                  
The πjk represent the fraction of the mass of agents that is of type jk (i.e., is of ability aj and of 
morality mk). Note that P is a function of the Tjk, which in turn are functions of the endogenous 
variables α and β. Total crowbar output R is equal to:
  
 (4)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
LL LH HL HH T T T T
LL i L i i LH i L i i HL i H i i HH i H i i
z z z z
R r a h z dz r a h z dz r a h z dz r a h z dz                  
 
C. Appropriation Technology 
We assume that all of the appropriated food is claimed by the appropriators, so that:  
(5a)  (1 )PR    










   9 
Equation (5b) represents an appropriation technology similar to that used in Grossman and Kim 
(2000).
4 It has the property that α  (0,1). It also has the property that α is decreasing in R/P: α is 
smaller when more crowbars are chasing less food. The parameter θ > 0 determines the magni-


















Both α and β are increasing in P and decreasing in R: producers keep a larger fraction of their 
food output, and appropriators get more food per crowbar, when fewer crowbars are chasing 
more food. The benefit of choosing this functional form of the appropriation technology is that 
the ratio α/β is equal to 1/θ, which is an exogenous constant, even though α and β are each endo-
genously determined by the sector choices of all the agents in the economy. Substituting 1/θ for 
α/β in (2) makes the Tjk thresholds exogenous as well. That is, the sector choice of any agent does 
not depend on the choices made by other agents.
5 While unrealistic, this simplifies the model and 
                                                 
4 This appropriation technology has the property that α is the same for each producer regardless of her food output 
and β is the same for each appropriator regardless of his crowbar output. If every producer had the same food output 
and every appropriator had the same crowbar output, one would expect this to be true since every producer would 
have an equal probability of meeting (and losing their food to) an appropriator. In the present model, however, not 
every producer has the same food output, and not every appropriator has the same crowbar output. In this setting, 
there is no general result that α and β will be constants. Nevertheless, we retain the assumptions in (5a) and (5b) 
because they greatly simplify the analysis, and because there is no alternative assumption (tractable or otherwise) 
that is obviously superior. One (highly stylized) scenario that would generate a constant α and β would be as fol-
lows. Suppose that food is stored in grain elevators. If all elevators are the same size, then no appropriator will have 
any greater reason to attack one than another, so any particular unit of food (whether it is the 1st or the 100th unit of 
the producer who grew it) will have an equal probability of being appropriated. As long as the costs of using any 
particular sized elevator are the same across producers, one would expect to see a pooling equilibrium emerge in 
which everyone uses the same sized elevator. The reason is that anyone who uses an elevator size that attracts an 
above-average number of attacks will want to switch to the common elevator size. Similarly, if there were an eleva-
tor size that caused a below-average number of attacks, everyone else would want to switch to that size. Combining 
this assumption with an assumption of constant returns to scale in appropriation (i.e., two crowbars are exactly twice 
as good as one), generates a constant α and β. 
5 To see this, suppose an agent switched from appropriation to production. This would increase α (fewer crowbars 
chasing more food), and also increase β (for the same reason). In general, the ratio α/β could increase or decrease, 
but the assumed technology guarantees that it remains constant, which means that the Tjk thresholds would be unaf-  10 
makes it possible to abstract from strategic sector choice decisions that are not central to the 
point of the paper. 
 
D. Information and Timing 
The only decision agents make is which sector to join, and each agent i bases this decision 
solely on whether zi is higher or lower than the threshold value Tjk for his or her type.
6 Since we 
have shown above that α/β is equal to 1/θ, we can see from (2) that agents need only know their 
own zi, their type, the value of the parameter θ, and the ratio r(aj)/p(aj). All agents make their 
sector choices simultaneously. 
 
E. Equilibrium 
  Equations (3), (4), (5a), and (5b) constitute a system of four equations and four endogenous 
variables (P, R, α, and β). An equilibrium is a set of values P*, R*, α*, and β* such that P* and 
R* reflect utility-maximizing behavior when α = α* and β = β*, and such that α* and β* arise 
from the appropriation technology when P = P* and R = R*. As discussed above, the appropria-
tion technology has the property that α/β is equal to 1/θ, which means that the Tjk thresholds in 
(2) are exogenous constants that can be plugged into (3) and (4), generating expressions for P* 
and R* without needing to solve the system. These are not complete analytic solutions, as (3) 
                                                                                                                                                             
fected, which in turn means that the switch would not affect the sector choice of any other agent. In contrast, other 
models such as Acemoglu (1995) and Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) have multiple equilibria because the rela-
tive returns to production and appropriation depend on how many producers and how many appropriators there are 
in the economy.  
6 The fact that P* depends solely on the Tjk thresholds means that the only social cost of appropriative activities is 
the foregone food output of the appropriators. The social cost would be larger if appropriation itself, or defenses 
against appropriation, dissipated food. It would also be larger if the model included a choice between labor and lei-
sure. In the latter case, appropriation would have the effect of a tax on food production; as long as the labor supply 
curve is upward-sloping in the relevant region, it would cause those agents who still become producers to work less, 
which would exacerbate the negative effects of appropriation beyond those discussed in this model.   11 
contains εi and (4) contains ηi, whose distributions are not independent of zi  εi/ηi. However, 
they will be sufficient for our purposes below. 
 
F. Theory Results 
We next consider the effect of changes in the correlation between morality and ability. The 
correlation can be increased, while holding the aggregate levels of morality and ability constant, 
by changing a mass of random high-ability agents from low to high morality (replacing HL 
agents with HH agents), and changing an equal-sized mass of random low-ability agents from 
high to low morality (replacing LH agents with LL agents).
7 Changing an individual agent from 
low to high morality may have no effect on the agent’s sector choice: the agent may have already 
been a producer before the change, or may prefer to be an appropriator even after the change. 
But those agents with a zi between THH and THL will switch from appropriation to production, 
thereby increasing productive sector output P*. Agents with a zi between TLH and TLL will switch 
in the opposite direction. If the mass of agents changed in each direction is , then the net change 
in the measure of agents employed in the productive sector will be: 




i i i i
TT
h z dz h z dz 

  
   
The expression in  (7) is not  generally  equal  to  zero: just because the mass  of  agents  with  i n-
creased morality is equal to the mass of agents with decreased morality does not mean that the 
mass of switchers (i.e., the mass of agents between THH and THL) from appropriation to produc-
                                                 
7 An equivalent exercise would be to change a mass of random high-morality agents from low to high ability, and 
change a mass of equal measure of random low-morality agents from high to low ability. This exercise has the same 
effect as the one described in the text: they both involve adding HH and LL agents, and subtracting LH and HL 
agents. Also equivalent is to imagine that it were possible to inculcate morality, and that there were enough available 
resources to do so for one agent, and then to ask whether increasing the morality of a random high-ability agent has 
a larger or a smaller effect on food output than increasing the morality of a random low-ability agent.   12 
tion is equal to the mass of switchers in the opposite direction (the mass of agents between TLH 
and TLL), or that the switchers in both directions will have the same distribution of εi. 
  The effect on P* of increasing the correlation between morality and ability is equal to: 




i H i i i L i i
TT
p a h z dz p a h z dz   

  
   
This  effect  depends  on  three  factors:  (i)  the  difference  between  aH and  aL;  (ii) the mass of 
switchers in each direction (which depends on the distribution of zi, and on the four Tjk thre-
sholds); and (iii) the distribution of εi (which is not independent of zi) among the switchers in 
both directions. Only (i) is unambiguous, which leads to the following propositions: 
 
Proposition 1: All else equal, the effect on P* of increasing the correlation between morality and 
ability is more positive or less negative the larger the difference between aH and aL. 
 
Proof: Immediate from (8). 
 
If we restrict the relationship between the production functions p(aj) and r(aj), we obtain an un-
ambiguous result on the effect of increasing the correlation between morality and ability. 
 
Proposition 2: If the ratio of appropriative sector output to productive sector output r(aj)/p(aj) is 
independent  of  ability,  then  increasing  the  correlation  between  morality  and  ability  unambi-
guously makes aggregate productive sector output P* increase, regardless of the distribution of 
zi.  
 
Proof: We see from (2) that if r(aj)/p(aj) is independent of aj, then TLH = THH and TLL = THL, 
which means both that the mass of switchers is equal in both directions, and that the distribution 
of εi is the same among switchers in both directions, regardless of the distribution of zi. It is im-
mediate from (8) that this, combined with the fact that aH > aL, proves the result.                                                      
 
The intuition behind these results is that one effect of increasing the correlation between mo-
rality and ability is that those agents whose increased morality induces them to switch from ap-
propriation to production are of high ability, whereas those agents whose decreased morality in-
duces them to switch in the opposite direction are of low ability, which tends to increase the total   13 
amount of ability employed in the productive sector and hence increase P*. We refer to this as 
the “main” effect in the model. This effect is stronger the larger the difference in ability between 
high and low ability agents. And if the mass of switchers and the distribution of εi are the same in 
both directions, then this is the only effect operating, and so P* unambiguously increases.
8 
But it is not generally true that the mass of switchers or the distribution of εi among switchers 
is the same in both directions, which means that these secondary effects can be present. They can 
reinforce or oppose the main effect described above. If they reinforce it, then the result that in-
creasing the correlation between morality and ability increases P* is strengthened. If they oppose 
it, then the net effect becomes ambiguous. In the following example, the mass of switchers from 
appropriation to production is smaller than the mass of switchers in the opposite direction, and 
by enough that the net effect on P* is negative. 
Example: Assume that f(εi) and g(ηi) are each independently distributed on U[0,1]. The distribu-
tion of zi  εi/ηi is ½ for 0 < zi < 1 and 1/2zi
2 for zi > 1. If r(aj)/p(aj) is increasing in aj, then THL – 
THH > TLL – TLH, so the range of zi characterizing switchers from appropriation to production is 
larger than the range characterizing switchers in the opposite direction. Nevertheless, if all four 
Tjk > 1, then the thin right tail of the distribution of zi can cause the mass of switchers from ap-
propriation to production to be smaller than the mass of switchers in the opposite direction. This 
















                                                 
8 These switches also affect the total number of crowbars produced. This affects the distribution of food output be-
tween producers and appropriators, but does not influence total food output. 
 
1  THH  THL 
1/2 
 
TLL  TLH  zi 











The fact THL > TLL and THH > TLH means that the zi for switchers from appropriation to production 
will be higher than for switchers in the opposite direction. Since zi and εi are positively corre-
lated, this weighs against P* decreasing. But it can still happen. The presence of εi in (8) means 
that this cannot be shown analytically, so we show it using a simple numerical analysis, which is 





While the thought experiment in the model involves changing the correlation between moral-
ity and ability within a country, the same reasoning can be applied to cross-country comparisons. 
The main empirical prediction of the model is that all else equal countries with a higher correla-
tion between morality and ability will have higher average incomes, except in those cases where 




A. Operationalizing Ability and Morality 
                                                 
9 A similar comparative statics result holds for an increase in total ability (holding morality constant). If the increase 
in ability has no effect on or reduces the threshold for joining the productive sector, then higher ability will increase 
food output. If the increase in ability raises the threshold for joining the productive sector, then the effect on food 
output is ambiguous. This is omitted from the text in the interest of brevity and because a similar result has already 
been shown by Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1991). The possibility that higher ability will not increase output is 
consistent with the conjecture of Pritchett (2001) that the empirical lack of a country-level relationship between 
schooling and output may be because that extra schooling is being diverted to appropriative ends. But other re-
searchers such as Cohen and Soto (2007) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) have found this relationship to be posi-
tive. Naturally, none of these papers control for any measure of morality. In results presented below, we also find a 
positive effect for schooling, and (more originally) a positive effect for schooling’s correlation with morality.   15 
  Providing convincing tests of the theory is challenging due to the difficulty of measuring mo-
rality, and to a lesser extent ability, across countries. A key variable in the model is the correla-
tion between morality and ability among workers in a society, so it is necessary to find survey 
data covering numerous countries in a reasonably comparable way. The World Values Survey 
(WVS) project is the source that best fulfills these criteria. We identify plausible proxies for abil-
ity and morality in the WVS, compute country-level variables from them, and include them in an 
income-levels regression based on the specification of Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004). 
Results are generally consistent with the main predictions of the theory. 
  The World Values Surveys have been conducted in more than 80 countries beginning in 
1981, in five survey “waves” through 2008. Samples are designed to be nationally representative, 
with the number of respondent households ranging from several hundred in some cases to several 
thousand in others. The survey questionnaire was originally designed in part to measure differ-
ences across countries and over time in materialist and “post-materialist” values as societies 
modernized and became wealthier. The data have been used in hundreds of academic publica-
tions, mostly in other disciplines but also in economics (e.g. Knack and Keefer, 1997; Alesina 
and La Ferrara 2005). 
  The best available proxy for ability in the WVS is educational attainment. The Data Appen-
dix lists the eight attainment categories from lowest to highest. We make one change in the WVS 
ordering, collapsing categories 4 and 5 because it is not clear whether respondents who have 
completed secondary education with a vocational emphasis have “more” (or less) education than 
those with an incomplete secondary education with a college preparatory emphasis. 
  Educational attainment is obviously an imperfect measure of ability. Some famously success-
ful entrepreneurs even in wealthy countries do not have university degrees. For several reasons it   16 
is correlated with ability (Griliches and Mason, 1972; Spence, 1973), however, and there is no 
more plausible proxy available in the WVS. 
  Measuring morality, defined as an aversion to earning a living through appropriative as op-
posed to productive work, is even more difficult. There are several survey questions in the WVS 
that are potentially relevant. In selecting our primary indicator of morality from among them, our 
first criterion was that the question pertain directly to work or employment choices. Our second 
criterion was that it must bear on the willingness to sacrifice income (or job-related leisure) to do 
work that may be regarded as more moral. No WVS question fully meets these two criteria, but 
the question that comes closest inquires about particular job characteristics that would be “most 
important” to the respondent if he/she “were looking for a job.” Specifically, we construct a 
“morality” dummy coded 1 for respondents who place the highest value on “doing an important 
job which gives you a sense of accomplishment,” and coded 0 for those who place greater value 
on high income, job security or likable co-workers.
10 The results we report below rely primarily 
on this morality proxy. However, in a subsequent section we present re sults for several alterna-
tive morality proxies from the WVS. 
  Following  the theory,  the  empirical  investigation  is  mainly  concerned  with  identifying 
whether or not it matters for economic performance if workers with more ability are also more 
“moral.” Therefore, the key independent variable in our analysis is the correlation of morality 
and ability among workers within each country.
11 In computing the correlation and in generating 
country-level aggregates for morality and ability, we drop all respondents not  in the labor force 
                                                 
10 See the Data Appendix for the complete survey question. If we measure morality more expansively as the share of 
respondents selecting “doing an important job which gives you a sense of accomplishment” as either their first or 
second priority among the four choices, the results reported in tables below change very little. The mean of this 
more expansively-defined variable is 40%, compared to 21% for the more restrictive definition based only on res-
pondents’ first choices. However, the two versions of the indicator are correlated at .95, and the ability-morality 
correlations computed using both versions are correlated at .86.  
11 Note we are not testing an interaction effect at the country level between morality and ability, as the theory does 
not imply that morality will matter more (or less) for economic performance in countries with more ability.   17 
(i.e. students, retirees and homemakers; the unemployed are included). Morality is dichotomous, 
and ability is measured by a 7-point ordinal scale, so we compute Spearman’s rather than Pear-
son’s correlation coefficients. 




th waves of the WVS in 74 countries.
12 For each of these three waves, the Data Appendix 
shows which of these 74 countries participated and the year in which the survey was  conducted. 
There are 38 countries that participated in only one of the three waves. In 24 countries, surveys 
were conducted in two waves, and the other 12 participated in all three waves. With 122 total 
surveys in the 74 countries, the mean number per country is 1.75. The mean survey year is 2002. 
  Following Bjornskov (forthcoming) and others, we take the mean values of WVS variables 
for the 36 countries with multiple surveys, based on the premise that the within-country variation 
over time is small and measured with substantial error relative to the cross-country variation in 
the surveys. As Bjornskov (forthcoming) finds for interpersonal trust, morality and ability (and 
their correlations) appear to be fairly stable over time. 
  Summary statistics of our data are presented in Table 1. The mean level of morality is 21%, 
ranging from a low of 5% for Uganda to a high of 49% for Sweden. In general, developed coun-
tries rank higher on morality, but the value for Uganda’s equally-poor neighbor Tanzania is 29%, 
and the Dominican Republic’s 39% places it above the majority of developed countries. 
  For most countries, there is a positive but modest correlation between morality and ability. 
The correlation is negative but small in Uganda (-.04), Mali (-.10) and Tanzania (-.13). The mean 
correlation for the 74 countries is +.14, with a maximum of +.27 (for Czech Republic). 
                                                 
12 The morality question was not included in the first two WVS waves (1981-84 and 1990-93). We drop several 
countries (including Andorra and Cyprus) with WVS data on ability and morality due to missing data on income, 
trade or other key variables in the analysis. Colombia is dropped because its survey included an additional response 
category for the morality indicator, so its value is not comparable to those of other countries.    18 
  The voluminous cross-country  empirical  literature on  economic performance presents  re-
flects no particular consensus on dependent variables (e.g. income growth rates or income levels) 
or on model specification. For simplicity and transparency, we adopt the recent and influential 
approach of Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004), who analyze the “deep determinants” of 
per capita income levels. They compare the contributions of “institutions,” geography and trade--
acknowledging the complex inter-relationships among them--and conclude that “the quality of 
institutions trumps everything else” (p. 135). Glaeser et al. (2004) argue that “human capital is a 
more basic source of growth” than the institutional indicators used by RST and Acemoglu, John-
son and Robinson (2001). This argument fits our emphasis on ability, so we add it (measured by 
educational attainment) as a fourth “deep determinant” of income levels when testing the effects 
of morality and its correlation with ability. 
  We follow RST in measuring economic performance by the log of GDP per capita, adjusted 
for purchasing power parity. Their data are for 1995, but we update this to 2008, because our in-
dependent variables from the WVS are from 1995 and later. 
 
B. Main Empirical Results 
  As discussed above, the “main” effect of the model predicts per-capita income to be increas-
ing in the correlation between morality and ability. This prediction is overturned only if “second-
ary” effects are present, and on net work sufficiently strongly against the main effect, which 
seems unlikely. The theory can therefore be said to predict a positive relationship, with the ca-
veat that if such a relationship were not found it would remain to investigate the magnitudes and 
directions of the secondary effects before concluding that the theory is invalid.      19 
  We first regress income on only our ability and morality proxies, in equation 2-1 of Table 2. 
At the respondent level, ability is measured by an ordinal scale, and we aggregated it to generate 
several interval-level measures based on different cut-points. Preliminary testing indicated that 
income was strongly and negatively related to the share of the labor force with no secondary 
schooling.  Differentiating  among  higher  levels  of  attainment  (e.g.  secondary  versus  post-
secondary) provided little or no additional explanatory power, and had only trivial effects on the 
coefficient estimates for other variables of interest. For simplicity, we therefore measure ability 
in our regressions as the labor force share without any secondary schooling; this is the lowest 
achievement level on the seven-point ordinal scale we used in computing the Spearman correla-
tions of morality and ability within countries.
13  
  Morality and (low) ability are both highly significant in equation 2 -1, and together explain 
more than half of the cross-country variation in income. Equation 2-2 adds the morality-ability 
correlation as a third regressor, and its coefficient is also highly significant with the hypothesized 
positive sign. Coefficients and t -values for morality and ability decline somewhat in absolute 
value relative to equation 2-1, but they remain highly significant. The three regressors collective-
ly explain 62% of the variation in income. Converted to standard deviation units, the three coef-
ficients are very similar in magnitude:  -.33 (ability), +.34 (morality), and .36 (morality -ability 
correlation). 
Equation 2-3 reports results in our sample of countries for the basic RST specification, using 
their main indicators of geography (distance in degrees of latitude from the equator), trade (e x-
ports plus imports as a share of GDP in 2006), and institutions (“Rule of Law” for 2006 from the 
                                                 
13 We also tested the country-level mean of the full 7-point ordinal-level scale. It provides a marginal improvement 
in explaining the cross-country variation in incomes, but again with only trivial effects on the coefficients of other 
variables in the analysis. We therefore report results using an aggregate indicator of ability that does not violate the 
properties of the underlying scale, namely the share of the labor force with no secondary schooling.   20 
Worldwide Governance Indicators). Equation 2-3 includes only these three regressors, and is es-
timated for the same 74-country sample included in equations 2-1 and 2-2. Collectively the three 
RST regressors explain 63% of the variation in income, approximately the same as the three 
WVS regressors in equation 2-2. Geography and institutions but not trade are strongly signifi-
cant, and in the expected direction. These results are very similar to those reported in Table 2 of 
RST, despite a much different sample of countries, suggesting there is nothing peculiar about this 
74-country sample for which WVS data are available. As shown in Table 3, there are fairly 
strong correlations among some of these six regressors (three from the WVS and three from 
RST). Ability (human capital), morality and the morality-ability correlation are all significantly 
higher in countries located further from the equator and with a stronger “rule of law.” 
  Unsurprisingly, the strong relationships of some of these variables with income in equations 
2-2 and 2-3 weaken somewhat when all six are included together in equation 2-4. Relative to the 
previous results,  in  equation 2-4 coefficients  for morality and distance  from  equator are cut 
roughly in half, but morality remains significant at the .10 level and distance remains significant 
at the .05 level. Coefficients for ability, rule of law and the morality-ability correlation are re-
duced by roughly one-third, but all remain significant at the .01 level.
14 Collectively the six re-
gressors explain 77% of the variation in income. 
Based on equation 2-4, an increase of .1 (equal to about one quarter of the range exhibited in 
the sample) in the correlation between morality and ability is associated with a 36% increase in 
per capita income. Each percentage-point increase in morality is associated with a 1.7% increase 
in income. Each percentage-point increase in the labor force share with no secondary schooling 
                                                 
14 Although structural modeling of these interrelationships is beyond the scope of this paper, these results are consis-
tent with the interpretation that geography and institutions as measured by RST affect income in part through their 
effects on schooling, morality and on the correlation between them. Alternatively, “institutions” (i.e. the rule of law 
index) may be measuring, in part, morality and its correlation with ability.   21 
is associated with a 2% drop in income. Converting all variables into standard-deviation units, 
each one standard deviation increase in the correlation between morality and ability is associated 
with an increase in the log of per capita income of one-fourth of a standard deviation, approx-
imately equal to $3600 for the median-income country in our sample.
15 This standardized coeffi-
cient of .25 is comparable to that for schooling ( -.23 standard deviations), and larger than for 
geography or morality (both at .16), and openness (.08). Only rule of law (.38) has a larger sta n-
dardized coefficient). 
The ability and morality variables are computed from survey data, with different sample sizes 
in each country’s surveys. Values estimated from larger samples will tend to be more precise, so 
the observations for those countries contain more information. In equation 2-5, we report esti-
mates using weighted least squares, with observations weighted by the number of WVS respon-
dents. Results from WLS estimation differ only trivially from the OLS results in equation 2-4. 
Equation 2-6 shows how results change when the most influential observation in favor of our 
key hypothesis is dropped. Figure 1 depicts the partial correlation between the dependent varia-
ble and the morality-ability correlation from equation 2-4. Thus, the slope of the least-squares 
line imposed on the figure equals the regression coefficient 3.616. Tanzania is clearly the most 
influential case in our favor. When this observation is dropped in equation 2-6, the coefficient of 
the morality-ability correlation declines from 3.62 to 2.85, but remains significant at the .01 lev-
el. Two other relatively influential cases are Uganda and Kyrgyzstan.
16 When they and Tanzania 
                                                 
15 The standard deviation of (log of) per capita income in the sample is 1.13, so a standard deviation increase in the 
morality-ability correlation will be associated with an increase of about .28 (=1.13 x .25) in the log of per capita 
income. This .28 estimate coincides with the difference in log of per capita income between the two median-income 
countries in our sample, Bulgaria (9.33) and Russia (9.61). In dollar terms, the difference in incomes between these 
two countries is $3658 (= 14, 917 - 11, 259). Because income is in logs, the marginal effect in terms of dollars will 
be greater (lower) for countries at higher (lower) income levels. For countries at the 25
th percentile of the income 
distribution in our sample (such as Georgia or Guatemala), the marginal effect is about $1400, and for countries at 
the 75
th percentile (such as Israel or Korea) it is about $8000. 
16 Mali is also a negative outlier on the ability-morality correlation, but it lies above the regression line.   22 
are dropped, the coefficient declines further to 1.63, but remains significant at the .10 level. The 
oil exporters Trinidad and Venezuela are the largest positive outliers, with income higher than 
predicted given their morality-ability correlations, but dropping Trinidad strengthens rather than 
weakens the relationship, and dropping Venezuela makes no difference.
17 
In Equation 2-7, we follow RST in controlling for three additional geographic variables asso-
ciated with “natural” openness to trade. Controlling for them implies that the direct measure of 
trade will better reflect the impact of policies favoring trade. The trade coefficient declines rela-
tive to its value in the base specification in equation 2-4. Among the additional geography va-
riables, only the landlocked dummy achieves significance, at the .10 level.
18 Inclusion of these 
variables has little effect on results for other regressors. Adding dummies for the 19 high-income 
OECD countries and the 23 “transition” economies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Un-
ion similarly has only trivial effects on results for the morality and other variables. 
 
C. Endogeneity 
  Estimates reported in Table 2 potentially reflect two-way causation. For example, in higher-
income countries workers may have a lower marginal benefit to further increases in their income 
and can better afford to indulge any tastes for doing more moral work. If so, the morality coeffi-
cient could be biased upwards. A variation of this argument would suggest an upward bias in the 
morality-ability coefficient. Suppose that in low income countries few workers, even among the 
more able, can afford to indulge any tastes for doing moral work. The morality-ability correlation 
                                                 
17 These and other results described below are not reported in tables but are available on request from the authors.  
18 Frankel and Romer (1999) construct predicted trade from these geography variables and from geographic di s-
tances between potential trading partners.  They did not construct predicted trade share for many of the transition 
economies, and inclusion of this variable in our tests reduces the sample size from 74 to 56. Nevertheless, coeffi-
cients for morality and the ability-morality correlation remain positive and significant when it is added, and the pre-
dicted trade share itself is not significant.  
   23 
will be near zero in those countries. In high income countries more workers, particularly among 
the more able, can afford to trade off income against moral or other psychic considerations when 
choosing a job. The morality-ability correlation will be positive in those countries. 
We address these endogeneity concerns in several ways. First, as explained in more detail be-
low, we exploit time series variation in the data, by modifying the sample or alternatively by 
modifying the specification. Subsequently, we instrument for the morality variables using 2SLS 
and limited-information maximum likelihood (LIML) in Table 5. Coefficients for the morality-
ability correlation variable remain positive and highly significant in these tests, while results for 
the morality proxy are mixed.  
Income is measured for 2008, while the morality variables are measured from surveys con-
ducted between 1995 and 2008 but with variation among countries. The potential for estimates to 
reflect reverse causation from income to morality is reduced somewhat by measuring morality 
further back in time, e.g. for 1995 instead of for 2008. Accordingly, in equation 4-1 of Table 4 
we drop the 19 observations for which morality is measured using only the 5
th WVS survey wave 
(2005-2008). This change reduces the mean survey year represented in the data by two years, 
from 2002 to 2000. The model specification is from equation 2-4, based on RST but with the 
morality variables added. The coefficient for the morality proxy in equation 4-1 is insignificant 
and only one-third as large as in equation 2-4, consistent with the view that the latter estimate 
mostly reflects reverse causation from income to morality. The coefficient on the morality-ability 
correlation remains positive and highly significant, however, in equation 4-1. Moreover, its coef-
ficient is one-third larger in equation 4-1 than in equation 2-4.  
In equation 4-2 we drop an additional 13 observations with a mean survey year greater than 
2001. This change reduces the mean survey year by one additional year, from 2000 to 1999. Re-  24 
sults are very similar to those in equation 4-1. The morality-ability correlation remains highly 
significant for this smaller sample.  
In equation 4-3 we measure ability (schooling), morality, and the morality-ability correlation 
using only the 1995-1998 WVS surveys. For this sample, the mean year for surveys used is 
1996. This change not only limits the sample size – by dropping countries included only in the 
later survey waves – but arguably introduces more random measurement error for most of the 
remaining countries, by throwing away information from the subsequent survey waves. Never-
theless, schooling, morality and the morality-ability correlation are all significant with the ex-
pected signs in equation 4-3.  
Equation 4-4 includes all 74 countries, but measures the morality variables using only the 
earliest available WVS wave for each country. Equation 4-5 is similar in other respects but 
measures the morality variables using only the most recent available WVS. (For 38 countries 
these are the same values in both tests.) If causation runs mostly from income to morality, the 
morality variables should have more explanatory power in equation 4-5 than in 4-4. However, 
the R
2 is marginally higher in 4-4 (.77) than in 4-5 (.76). The coefficient for the initial-wave mo-
rality-ability correlation is also somewhat higher (in 4-4) than for the final-wave. The reverse is 
true for the morality proxy: its coefficient is larger when measured using final-wave data. 
In results not reported in Table 4 for space reasons, we include both sets of morality variables 
together, measured using the initial-wave and final-wave WVS. For the morality proxy, only the 
final-wave variable is significant (at the .10 level). For the morality-ability correlation, only the 
initial-wave variable is significant (at the .05 level). These results, and those in Table 4, are con-
sistent with the view that any causal relationship between income and the morality-ability corre-
lation runs from the latter to the former. For the morality proxy, on the other hand, the results are   25 
suggestive of at least some reverse causation from income to morality. These tests each throw 
away some of the WVS data, however, and (as mentioned above) we agree with Bjornskov 
(forthcoming) and others that the within-country variation over time is a highly noisy measure of 
actual change. In Table 5 therefore we adopt an alternative (and more conventional) approach by 
instrumenting  for  the  potentially  endogenous  morality  variables.
19  Results for the morality -
ability correlation from these tests are strikingly similar to those presented in Table 4, while r e-
sults for the morality proxy are more favorable (i.e. more positive and consistently significant). 
For instruments we rely pri marily on religious composition of the population, using data 
from McCleary and Barro (2006). There are several precedents in the literature. La Porta et al. 
(1997, 1999) find that interpersonal trust and tax compliance are lower, and corruption higher, in 
countries with more adherents of “hierarchical” religions (Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, or Mus-
lim). Zak and Knack (2001) instrument for interpersonal trust with these religious composition 
variables in cross-country growth regressions. Knack (2002) uses a broader set of religious com-
position variables in instrumenting for several “social capital” indicators in analyzing determi-
nants  of  government  performance  across  the  American  states.  Building  on  Weber  (1905), 
McCleary (2007) and McCleary and Barro (2006) describe how some of the major religions fos-
ter traits such as honesty and charity, and attitudes toward work. Religious composition poten-
tially provides a relevant and valid set of instruments for our morality variables. They are rele-
vant instruments if “differences in motivational mechanisms” across the major religions explain 
much of the cross-country variation in the morality variables, and they may be valid as “it is not 
                                                 
19 Rule of law and trade openness have been treated as endogenous in some studies, including RST (2004). We treat 
them as exogenous for three reasons. First, with more endogenous regressors it is more difficult to find a set of in-
struments that successfully discriminates among them. Second, a test of “weak instruments” telling us whether they 
discriminate among them sufficiently is available only for the case of three or fewer endogenous variables. Third, in 
general fitted values from first-stage regressions are less effective as “control” variables in testing more central hy-
potheses (Dollar and Kraay, 2003; Angrist and Pischke, 2010), in this case for the morality variables.   26 
clear that one religion is more supportive than another of economic productivity” (McCleary, 
2007). We report formal tests of relevance and validity below. 
We supplement religious composition with one additional exogenous instrument, from the 
“State Antiquity Index” project of Bockstette, Chanda and Putterman (2002). Specifically, we 
use their estimate of (the log of) number of years of statehood from 1 AD to 1950 AD.
20 These 
authors suggest that a more extensive history of statehood “may support the development of atti-
tudes consistent with bureaucratic discipline and hierarchical control,” but also fosters a common 
language and sense of identity, facilitating trust and harmonious social interaction. 
When instrumenting for multiple endogenous variables, it is important that the excluded in-
struments not be related in too similar a way to both the morality proxy and the morality-ability 
correlation. A weak instruments problem can be present even if they have strong explanatory 
power in both first-stage regressions, if the fitted values from those regressions are highly corre-
lated with each other. In other words, the excluded instruments must discriminate reasonably 
well between the two endogenous variables. We report formal tests for this weak instruments 
problem below. With few exceptions, theory does not provide much guidance as to which in-
struments might predict the morality-ability correlation but not the morality proxy. According to 
McCleary (2007), upper-caste Hindu men have a duty to “earn a living responsibly,” suggesting 
percent Hindu may be positively correlated with the morality-ability correlation. In general how-
ever our strategy is simply to let the data determine whether the instruments can discriminate 
sufficiently between the two endogenous variables. 
                                                 
20 Coding is based on three key questions for territory corresponding to the boundaries of modern nations: (1) was 
there a government above the tribal level? (2) Was the government locally based or foreign (e.g. a colony)? (3) How 
much of the modern territory was ruled by this government? We follow Bockstette, Chanda and Putterman (2002) in 
using their version of this variable that discounts by 5% to reduce the weight of periods in the more remote past.    27 
  Equations 5-1 and 5-2 (in Table 5) respectively report first-stage 2SLS results for the morali-
ty proxy and the morality-ability correlation. Several religious-composition variables were col-
lapsed, based on preliminary results. Specifically, percent Protestant and percent Catholic were 
combined into “Western Christian,” as results for them were very similar, for both endogenous 
regressors. Omitted categories are Buddhist, “other religion,” and “non-religious,” as these like-
wise showed similar (non-significant) results in both first-stage regressions, in preliminary tests. 
Several instruments are positive and significant in both equations 5-1 and 5-2. These include 
percent Western Christian, percent Jewish, and percent “other Eastern religions.” Percent Mus-
lim is significant (with a positive coefficient) only in the morality regression, and percent “other 
Christian” and years of statehood are significant (and positive) only in the morality-ability re-
gression. The explanatory power of the instruments is reasonably good, as indicated by the par-
tial R
2s for the excluded instruments of .22 and .27.
21 More importantly for instrument relevance 
in this case of multiple endogenous variables, Shea’s (1997) partial R
2s (which adjust for correla-
tion between the two fitted values) are also relatively high, at .21 and .26. Angrist and Pischke 
(2009) provide first-stage F statistics for weak- and under-identification where there are multiple 
endogenous variables. For both of our first-stage regressions, the null hypotheses of weak and 
under identification are rejected at the 05 level. 
Stock and Yogo (2005) provide two alternative formal criteria for weak instruments: (1) the 
maximal bias of the IV estimator relative to the OLS estimator exceeds some threshold (e.g. 10, 
20 or 30%); (2) the maximal size bias of Wald tests on IV parameters (under the null of weak 
instruments) exceeds some threshold. They provide critical values for the relevant F statistics. 
The Kleibergen-Paap F statistic for weak identification (robust to the presence of heteroskedas-
ticity) in our 2SLS regression is 11.77 (see second-stage 2SLS equation, 5-3). This value exceeds 
                                                 
21 While there is no clear threshold, we note that Dollar & Kraay refer to a partial R
2 of .25 as “respectable.”   28 
the 10.22 critical value for 10% maximal relative IV bias, and the 10.41 critical value for max-
imal IV size bias in Wald tests. Overall the evidence is fairly strong in rejecting the null of weak 
instruments. Nevertheless, we not only report results from 2SLS in Table 5, but also for an alter-
native IV estimator, that is more robust to the presence of weak instruments, namely LIML (li-
mited information maximum likelihood). In contrast to 2SLS estimates, LIML estimates are con-
sistent under a weaker set of assumptions on instrument strength (Chao and Swanson, 2005). 
Second-stage results from 2SLS are presented in equation 5-3. The morality-ability coeffi-
cient is positive and significant at the .01 level as in OLS, and almost twice as large (6.59 com-
pared to 3.62) than in the similar OLS specification of equation 2-4. The morality proxy is posi-
tive and significant at the .05 level. Its coefficient is almost three times as large as its OLS coun-
terpart (.047, compared to .017 in equation 2-4), perhaps reflecting a correction for attenuation 
bias associated with measurement error in our morality indicator.  
Both morality and the morality-ability correlation also exhibit positive and significant coeffi-
cients in LIML estimation in equation 5-4, with magnitudes slightly larger than in 2SLS. In both 
2SLS and LIML, the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid is supported; p-values for the 
relevant test of overidentifying restrictions are .77 and .79 respectively. As with the OLS results, 
the 2SLS and LIML results change very little if we weight countries by their number of survey 
respondents or if we drop Tanzania. 
    
D. Alternative Morality Proxies in the WVS 
  In Table 6 we report results for other possible morality proxies included in the WVS. Several 
other questions in the WVS pertain to work-related “values,” but they focus on the decision to   29 
work or not work,
22 and provide no information on what aspects of work provide utility or di s-
utility to respondents. Nor do the questions require respondents to make tradeoffs among values, 
as in our preferred question. We therefore consider them less apt for our pu rpose, but in the in-
terests of transparency we report results for several of these questions. For space reasons, results 
are shown only for the morality variables, not the control variables, and we focus on their sign 
and statistical significance and do not interpret coefficient magnitudes.  
Column 6-1 of Table 6 reports results for a question on whether respondents agree that “work 
is a duty to society.” The model specifications are similar to those in equations 2-4 (OLS), 5-3 
(2SLS), and 5-4 (LIML), but replacing our primary morality indicator, and its correlation with 
ability, with others based on the duty-to-work question. Results are mixed in column 6-1. The 
morality proxy (duty to work) is not significant in OLS, 2SLS or LIML. Its correlation with 
ability has a negative coefficient that is highly significant in OLS and marginally significant in 
2SLS  and  LIML.  The  overidentification  test  rejects  instrument  validity  for  2SLS,  however. 
Another WVS question asks respondents to agree or disagree that “it’s humiliating to receive 
money without having to work for it.” The percentage of respondents who agree is not signifi-
cantly related to economic performance; neither is its correlation with ability. 
  Other questions we considered in the WVS are unrelated to work choices or attitudes, but 
may still capture “morality” as we have defined it. Some are from a list of qualities that respon-
dents may select as being important for encouraging children “to learn at home.” Columns 6-2 
and 6-3 respectively report results for two of these: “feeling of responsibility” and “tolerance and 
respect for other people.” The relevant coefficients based on these questions are consistently pos-
itive, as hypothesized, in OLS, 2SLS and LIML. Three out of four coefficients are significant at 
                                                 
22  These  questions  are  commonly  used  in  testing  hypotheses  about  the  “Protestant  work  ethic”  (Geser,  2009; 
McCleary and Barro, 2006).   30 
the .10 level in OLS, and at the .05 or .01 level in 2SLS. In LIML, the morality-ability correla-
tion (based on the “tolerance and respect” question in column 6-3) is significant at the .01 level, 
but the other three coefficients are not significant at conventional levels. 
“Unselfishness” was another item on this list of important qualities for children to learn. Re-
sults are not reported in the table for space reasons, but the morality-ability correlations were 
positive and significant in 2SLS (at .01) and in LIML (at .05). The OLS coefficients were insig-
nificant, as were the IV coefficients for the morality proxy (percentage of respondents identify-
ing unselfishness as an important quality). 
  Column 6-4 reports results for an additional alternative morality indicator. It is based on a 
WVS question asking respondents to choose their first priority from a list of four social objec-
tives: “a stable economy,” “progress toward a society in which ideas count more than money,” 
“the fight against crime,” and “progress toward a less impersonal and more humane society.” We 
took the last option as the “moral” one, and this definition of morality, while having nothing to 
do with employment choices, comports closely with the everyday meaning of the word. In col-
umn 6-4, the morality proxy itself is not significant in OLS, 2SLS, or LIML, but its correlation 
with ability is positive and highly significant in all three tests.
23 
  A final set of potentially relevant questions in the WVS ask about whether certain anti-social 
behaviors (e.g., cheating on taxes, avoiding a fare on public transport, or taking a bribe) can ever 
be justified. The vast majority of respondents indicate these behaviors are never justifiable, and 
many respondents may simply be providing the socially desirab le answer, whether or not it is 
consistent with their behavior. Furthermore, all of these measures involve attitudes towards 
cheating the government, which may not correspond closely to the producer-appropriator distinc-
tion, particularly in countries where the government is regarded as highly corrupt. In any event, 
                                                 
23 Sample sizes vary in Table 6 as certain questions were asked only in certain WVS waves.   31 
if these questions are substituted for our morality proxy, they produce insignificant results (not 
reported in tables for space reasons). 
 
E. Morality and Appropriation 
  The theory in Section III is not the only possible explanation for the empirical links between 
morality (and the morality-ability correlation) with economic performance, shown in Tables 2-6.  
The theory’s relevance arguably would be more convincing supported if morality, and the moral-
ity-ability correlation, were also linked with lower levels of “appropriative” activities.  It is diffi-
cult to measure the extent of “appropriation” in a reliable way at the country level, but in Table 7 
we present some evidence from surveys of business executives, conducted by the World Eco-
nomic Forum (2010) and available for 73 of the 74 countries in our main sample (Belarus is the 
missing country). 
  Surveys include about 100 respondents (and firms) per country.  Samples are designed to be 
at least roughly representative by sector.  Small firms are included, but larger firms and firms 
trading across borders are overrepresented.  Survey responses for most questions are on a 1-7 
ordinal scale, and the data made available by the WEF are country-level means of these ordinal 
scales, with higher values indicating “better” scores.     
    There are likely many important appropriative activities not addressed in the WEF’s ques-
tionnaire.  Moreover, we do not attempt to identify and control for the numerous other variables 
that might influence the extent of “appropriation.”  The regressions presented in Table 7 should 
therefore be interpreted as merely suggestive; they simply test whether or not certain appropriat-
ive activities seem to be larger problems in countries where morality is more prevalent among 
workers, and where morality is especially prevalent among workers with greater ability.     32 
  For three of the four types of appropriation measured, we do find the hypothesized link.  Eq-
uation 7-1 shows that in countries where morality and the morality-ability correlation are higher, 
survey respondents are significantly more confident that lost wallets will be returned with their 
contents intact.  Regression coefficients are standardized for comparison across equations, so a 
1-unit increase in the morality proxy is associated with an increase of .38 standard deviations in 
the 1-7 scale on returned wallets.   
  The wallets question pertains to individuals in the country taking advantage of each other.  A 
second question asks about ethical behavior of firms.  Equation 7-2 shows this question is posi-
tively and significantly related to the morality proxy, while the coefficient on the morality-ability 
correlation is positive but not significant.  A third question addresses the impact of crime and 
violence on business, in equation 7-3.  Both regressors have positive but insignificant coeffi-
cients.  The dependent variable in equation 7-4 is an index of the frequency of bribe solicitation 
encountered in dealing with public officials.  Both morality and the morality-ability correlation 
have positive and significant coefficients in this test. 
  Overall, these tests using a range of indicators on appropriative activities produce evidence 
consistent with the implications of the theory.  However, this limited analysis tells us very little 
about what sorts of appropriative activities are most damaging to economic performance.  Crime 
and violence may have particularly damaging effects, for example, even though they are not 
strongly correlated with our morality indicators.   
 
V. Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper investigates the relationship between the correlation between morality and human 
capital  one the one hand (where morality is  defined as  disutility of consuming appropriated   33 
goods), and economic performance on the other. The theory model predicts that this correlation 
will be positively related to performance, unless at the margin the sector choices of high-ability 
agents are sufficiently less responsive to morality than are those of low ability agents, in which 
case this relationship can be zero or even negative. It also predicts that the effect on performance 
is larger (or less negative) the greater the difference between low and high ability agents. 
In the theory model, we define “appropriation” as pure theft, agents engaged in appropriative 
activity produce nothing and spend their time working to transfer the output of productive people 
to themselves. In reality not all appropriative activities are equally damaging, some involve a 
pure transfer, so that the resulting social cost is only the foregone productive output of the ap-
propriators, while others, such as violent crime, can be much worse. The harmfulness of availa-
ble appropriative activities may vary across countries, which could confound our results if the 
countries with high correlations between morality and ability are also characterized by relatively 
mild forms of appropriation. However, while our data do not allow us to control for this directly, 
we do control for measures of institutional quality, which may to some extent capture this. 
Our empirical analysis finds that the within-country correlation between morality and ability 
has a very large effect on per-capita incomes. Under our preferred specification, a one-standard-
deviation increase in the correlation between morality and ability raises the log of per capita in-
come by about one-fourth of a standard deviation, approximately equal to $3600 for the median-
income country in our sample. Put differently, an increase of .1 in the correlation between moral-
ity and ability is associated with a 36% increase in per capita income. Correcting for endogeneity 
the effect is even larger. Using alternative proxies for morality produces mixed results, but the 
coefficient on the morality-ability correlation is usually positive and statistically significant. Fi-
nally, we also find evidence that the level of morality has a large effect on per-capital incomes.   34 
That the estimated effect is so large may seem surprising, but in our view it is not. Baumol 
(1990) and Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1991), have showed that the allocation of talent to 
productive rather than appropriative ends is a first-order determinant of economic performance. 
This suggests that anything that significantly influences the decisions of agents to be producers 
rather than appropriators is likely to be important. And though there is little direct evidence on 
the subject (Frank, 1996, is the only relevant paper of which we are aware) it seems quite plausi-
ble that morality is sometimes an important determinant of the decision to engage in productive 
vs. appropriate activities. And since the decisions of high-ability people are of particular impor-
tance, the correlation between morality and ability seems likely to be important as well. 
Finding a good proxy for morality as defined in our model is difficult, and there is room for 
doubt as to whether our preferred measure of morality (or any of our alternative measures) cap-
tures it well. But whether or not our empirical results can be regarded as a clean test of the 
theory, we believe that they are picking up something important. Our “morality” variables have 
significant explanatory power even when they are included in regressions alongside the standard 
variables emphasized by other researchers, which we regard as evidence that values, and particu-
larly the values held by the high-ability people in a society, somehow strongly influence eco-
nomic choices, and that these choices powerfully influence economic performance. Better under-
standing the precise nature of that influence promises to be a fruitful subject for future research. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
  Mean  Std. dev.  Min.  Max. 
Per capita GDP (PPP-adj.) 2008  15207  12807  802  49711 
Log per capita GDP  9.144  1.134  6.687  10.814 
No secondary schooling (proportion)  .088  .131  0  .643 
Morality (%)   21.27  10.72  5.02  48.64 
Correlation morality-schooling  .1387  .076  -.130  .268 
Geography (degrees latitude from equator)  32.99  17.93  1  64 
Institutions (“Rule of law” from WGI)  .150  .967  -1.38  2.00 
Trade (exports + imports as share of GDP)  89.54  58.25  25.83  456.65 
Log of trade   4.359  .498  3.252  6.124 
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Table 2: Basic regressions 
Equation number     2-1  2-2  2-3  2-4  2-5  2-6  2-7 


















               
No secondary   -3.798***  -2.906***    -2.012***  -1.981***  -2.221***  -1.846*** 
schooling (%)  (-4.49)  (-3.57)    (-3.31)  (-2.69)  (-3.24)  (-3.25) 
Morality   0.048***  0.036***    0.017*  0.015*  0.020**  0.017** 
  (6.31)  (4.63)    (1.94)  (1.73)  (2.20)  (2.06) 
Morality-ability    5.334***    3.616***  3.679***  2.845***  3.472*** 
correlation    (3.77)    (3.71)  (3.97)  (2.68)  (3.35) 
Distance from       0.021***  0.010**  0.011**  0.009*  0.012** 
equator      (3.60)  (2.07)  (2.12)  (1.80)  (2.06) 
trade share of       0.171  0.184  0.064  0.171  0.131 
GDP (log)      (0.94)  (1.24)  (0.39)  (1.15)  (0.72) 
Rule of law index      0.669***  0.449***  0.413***  0.453***  0.428*** 
      (8.01)  (4.75)  (4.39)  (4.77)  (4.36) 
Log of population              -0.019 
              (-0.23) 
Log of land area              -0.028 
              (-0.039) 
Landlocked              -0.309* 
              (-1.81) 
Constant   8.463  7.889  7.610  7.246  7.826  7.424  8.173 
  (36.87)  (30.79)  (9.44)  (9.24)  (9.62)  (9.19)  (6.01) 
R
2   .52  .62  .63  .77  .75  .77  .77 
Observations  74  74  74  74  74  73  74 
Mean dep. var.  9.14  9.14  9.14  9.14  9.14  9.17  9.14 
Dependent variable is log of 2008 GDP per capita (PPP -adjusted). Test statistics (from robust 
standard errors) are in parentheses. A *,** and *** respectively indicate significance at .10, .05 
and .01 levels for two-tailed tests.    38 
Table 3: Inter-correlations among regressors for 74-country main sample 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
1. Distance from equator           
2. Trade/GDP   0.21         
3. Rule of law  0.44  0.15       
4. No secondary schooling  -0.48  -0.26  -0.27     
5. Morality  0.30  -0.14  0.58  -0.31   
6. Morality-ability correlation  0.35  0.08  0.42  -0.38  0.38 
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Table 4: Endogeneity checks 
Equation number  4-1  4-2  4-3  4-4  4-5 
variation   Obs. from  




year > 2001 
dropped 
WVS 1995-
1998 only  
Initial 
WVS   
 
Final  
WVS   
 
           
No secondary   -1.603**  -3.841*  -4.410***  -2.260***  -1.947*** 
schooling (%)  (-2.23)  (-1.84)  (-2.75)  (-4.13)  (-2.73) 
Morality   0.005  0.005  0.046***  0.012  0.015** 
  (0.60)  (0.52)  (3.22)  (1.41)  (2.00) 
Morality-ability correlation  4.797***  4.908***  2.597**  3.432***  3.010*** 
  (4.61)  (3.08)  (2.16)  (3.73)  (3.01) 
Distance from   0.008  0.005  0.007  0.010*  0.012** 
Equator  (1.53)  (0.48)  (0.85)  (1.98)  (2.26) 
Trade share of   0.010  -0.004  -0.205  0.178  0.144 
GDP (log)  (0.06)  (-0.02)  (-1.27)  (1.21)  (0.97) 
Rule of law index  0.479***  0.408***  0.439***  0.467***  0.484*** 
  (4.45)  (3.12)  (5.19)  (4.93)  (5.17) 
Constant   8.154  8.453  9.694  7.399  7.526 
  (10.46)  (8.00)  (16.94)  (9.55)  (9.56) 
R
2   .75  .73  .73  .77  .76 
Observations  55  42  45  74  74 
Mean dep. var.  9.32  9.31  9.41  9.14  9.14 
Dependent variable is log of 2008 GDP per capita (PPP -adjusted). Test statistics (from robust 
standard errors) are in parentheses. A *,** and *** respectively indicate significance at .10, .05 
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Table 5: 2SLS and LIML regressions 
Equation number  5-1  5-2  5-3  5-4 
dependent variable  Morality  Morality-ability  
correlation 
Log GDP  
per capita 
Log GDP  
per capita 
  2SLS (1
st)  2SLS (1
st)  2SLS (2
nd )  LIML 
No secondary schooling  -16.429**  -0.013  -1.018*  -0.790 
(% of labor force)  (-2.12)  (-0.74)  (-1.62)  (-1.12) 
Distance from equator  0.099  0.002*  0.009*  0.009 
  (1.22)  (1.81)  (1.63)  (1.47) 
Trade share of GDP (ln)   -4.917***  -0.013  0.390**  0.444** 
  (-3.17)  (-0.74)  (2.07)  (2.01) 
Rule of law  3.593**  -0.002  0.192  0.129 
  (2.55)  (-0.16)  (1.31)  (0.72) 
Morality      0.047**  0.055** 
      (2.45)  (2.19) 
Morality-ability correlation      6.593***  7.118*** 
      (3.24)  (2.77) 
Western Christian % 1970  13.744***  0.120***     
  (3.96)  (2.67)     
Orthodox Christian % 1970  1.481  0.065     
  (0.30)  (1.45)     
Other Christian % 1970  0.154  0.212*     
  (0.01)  (1.82)     
Jewish % 1970  22.913***  0.095*     
  (6.26)  (1.92)     
Muslim % 1970  9.659**  0.048     
  (2.03)  (1.07)     
Hindu % 1970  2.259  0.121**     
  (0.38)  (2.34)     
Other Eastern % 1970  19.179**  0.360***     
  (2.07)  (2.66)     
Years of statehood (log)  -2.605  0.040**     
  (-1.39)  (2.11)     
Constant   46.665  -0.184  5.306  4.823 
  (3.13)  (-1.07)  (4.70)  (3.50) 
Centered R
2   .56  .42  .69  .69 
Mean dependent variable  21.3  .14  9.14  9.14 
Partial R
2 of excluded instruments  .22  .27  --  -- 
Shea partial R
2   .21  .26  --  -- 
Angrist-Pischke weak-ID p value  .0001  .024  --  -- 
Angrist-Pischke under-ID p value   .0001  .006  --  -- 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F   --  --  11.77  11.77 
Over-identification test p value  --  --  0.77  0.79 
Test statistics (from robust standard errors) are in parentheses. A *,** and *** respectively indi-
cate significance at .10, .05 and .01 levels for two-tailed tests. Number of observations is 74.     41 
Table 6: Alternative morality proxies 
Column #  6-1  6-2  6-3  6-4 










OLS         
Morality  -0.755  1.238*  0.565  0.886 
   (-1.26)  (1.96)  (0.72)  (1.06) 
Morality-ability  -3.460***  1.585*  1.496*  3.953*** 
correlation   (-3.53)  (1.84)  (1.71)  (3.54) 
No. observations  72  84  84  76 
         
2SLS         
Morality  0.115  3.075**  1.924  0.293 
   (0.05)  (2.04)  (1.21)  (0.15) 
Morality-ability  -3.319*  8.566**  6.380***  8.161*** 
correlation   (-1.81)  (2.40)  (2.93)  (3.59) 
Overid p value  .02  .65  .43  .41 
         
LIML         
Morality  0.570  2.799  2.803  -0.243 
   (0.11)  (1.06)  (1.11)  (-0.09) 
Morality-ability  -5.816*  14.822  8.485***  9.209*** 
correlation   (-1.74)  (1.48)  (2.58)  (3.12) 
Overid p value  .44  .92  .58  .48 
Dependent variable is log of GDP per capita (PPP-adjusted), 2008. Test statistics (from robust 
standard errors) are in parentheses. A * ,** and *** respectively indicate significance at .10, .05 
and .01 levels for two-tailed tests. OLS models use the specification of Table 2, equation 2-4 but 
with different proxies for morality as indicated in the column headings. 2SLS and LIML follow 
the specification of Table 5. Results are shown only for morality variables for space reasons, but 
complete results are available from authors on request.    42 
Table 7: Morality and appropriation 
 
Equation number     7-1  7-2  7-3  7-4 










         
Morality   0.38***  0.55***  0.09  0.49*** 
  (3.36)  (5.43)  (0.91)  (5.33) 
Morality-ability  0.27***  0.12  0.12  0.22*** 
correlation  (2.60)  (1.17)  (1.14)  (2.18) 
Constant   2.68  2.82  4.31  2.74 
  (10.43)  (12.79)  (17.27)  (11.60) 
R
2   .30  .37  .03  .37 
Mean, dep. var.  4.01  4.27  4.73  4.35 
 
Dependent variables are from the “Executive Opinion Survey” (World Economic Forum, 2010).  
Survey questions are printed below.  Regression coefficients are standardized.  Test statistics 
(from robust standard errors) are in parentheses. A *,** and *** respectively indicate signific-




In your country, if someone loses a purse or wallet containing US$100, and it is found by a 
neighbor, how likely is it to be returned with the money in it? 1 = Very unlikely, 7 = Very likely 
 
7-2 
How would you compare the corporate ethics (ethical behaviour in interactions with public offi-
cials, politicians and other enterprises) of firms in your country with those of other countries in 
the world? 1 = Among the worst in the world, 7 = Among the best in the world 
 
7-3 
To what extent does the incidence of crime and violence impose costs on businesses in your 
country? 1 = Significant costs, 7 = No costs 
 
7-4 
In your country, how common is it for firms to make undocumented extra payments or bribes 
connected with the following:  
 
a. Imports and exports?   1 = Very common, 7 = Never occurs 
b. Public utilities (e.g. telephone or electricity)?  
c. Annual tax payments?  
d. Awarding of public contracts and licenses?  
e. Obtaining favorable judicial decisions?  
    43 
Survey Questions  
Ability proxy from the World Value Surveys: educational attainment 
What is the highest education level that you have attained?  
1.  No formal education or incomplete primary school 
2.  Complete primary school 
3.  Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type 
4.  Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type 
5.  Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type 
6.  Complete secondary: university-preparatory type 
7.  Some university-level education, without degree 
8.  University-level education, with degree 
 
Morality proxy from the World Value Surveys: important aspects of jobs 
 
Now I would like to ask you something about the things which would seem to you, personally, most im-
portant if you were looking for a job. Here are some of the things many people take into account in rela-
tion to their work. Regardless of whether you’re actually looking for a job, which one would you, perso-
nally, place first if you were looking for a job?  
1.  A good income so that you do not have any worries about money 
2.  A safe job with no risk of closing down or unemployment 
3.  Working with people you like 
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Theory Appendix 
Suppose p(aj) = aj  and r(aj)/p(aj) = aj
2. If we could ignore εi, it would be straightforward to show 
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However,  the  fact  that  average εi is higher among switchers from appropriation to production 
than among switchers in the opposite direction means that εi cannot be ignored. To incorporate εi, 
we  performed  a  simple  numerical  simulation.  We  generated  observations  on  40,000  agents 
(10,000 for each type), each with independent random draws on U[0,1] for εi and for ηi.
24 We 
then randomly changed 5,000 agents from HL to HH, and changed 5,000 agents from LH to LL. 
Of these, 537 switched from appropriation to production, and 1,239 switched in the opposite di-
rection. This difference in the number of switchers is large enough to make the net effect on P* 
negative: total productive sector output falls from 16,730 to 16,161.  
   
                                                 
24 The parameter values were as follows: aH = 3, aL = 2, mH = 3/4, mL = 1/2, and θ = 1.   45 
Data Appendix  
74-country sample 
 
Country  WVS3  WVS4  WVS5  Morality  Correlation 
Albania  1998  2002  .  7.62  0.14 
Argentina  1995  1999  2006  21.16  0.24 
Armenia  1997  .  .  20.53  0.07 
Australia  1995  .  2005  40.01  0.16 
Azerbaijan  1997      5.72  0.09 
Bangladesh  1996  2002    15.55  0.17 
Belarus  1996      17.49  0.12 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  1998  2001    5.28  0.06 
Brazil  1997    2006  28.20  0.20 
Bulgaria  1997    2006  10.55  0.14 
Burkina Faso    .  2007  8.81  0.03 
Canada    2000  2006  43.11  0.16 
Chile  1996  2000  2005  18.65  0.16 
China  1995  2001  2007  21.85  0.18 
Czech Republic  1998      24.44  0.27 
Dominican Republic  1996      39.38  0.18 
Egypt, Arab Rep.      2008  8.82  0.11 
El Salvador  1999      20.46  0.09 
Estonia  1996      17.71  0.12 
Ethiopia      2007  6.35  0.10 
Finland  1996    2005  36.06  0.22 
France      2006  26.45  0.26 
Georgia      2008  14.23  0.03 
Germany  1997    2006  21.26  0.23 
Ghana      2007  8.06  0.06 
Guatemala      2005  21.93  0.08 
Hungary  1998      14.15  0.21 
India  1995  2001  2006  11.98  0.14 
Indonesia      2006  16.26  0.22 
Iran, Islamic Rep.      2007  31.27  0.22 
Israel    2001    36.50  0.14 
Italy      2005  33.64  0.16 
Japan    2000  2005  26.67  0.13 
Korea, Rep.  1996  2001  2005  17.54  0.22 
Kyrgyz Republic    2003    22.41  0.01 
Latvia  1996      24.82  0.22 
Lithuania  1997      10.17  0.20 
Macedonia, FYR  1998  2001    13.41  0.14   46 
Malaysia      2006  9.74  0.07 
Mali      2007  14.07  -0.10 
Mexico  1996  2000  2005  26.08  0.17 
Moldova  1996  2002  2006  13.48  0.13 
Morocco    2001  2007  16.27  0.09 
Netherlands      2006  32.75  0.10 
New Zealand  1998      40.54  0.18 
Nigeria  1995      22.14  0.16 
Norway  1996      47.90  0.26 
Peru  1996  2001  2008  26.37  0.23 
Philippines  1996  2001    13.10  0.06 
Poland      2005  17.95  0.07 
Romania  1998    2005  13.62  0.17 
Russian Federation  1995    2006  13.47  0.12 
Rwanda      2007  16.08  0.05 
Serbia  1996  2001  2006  17.96  0.15 
Singapore    2002    22.69  0.26 
Slovak Republic  1998      20.79  0.17 
Slovenia  1995    2005  30.11  0.18 
South Africa    2001  2007  14.45  0.13 
Spain  1995  2000  2007  20.15  0.19 
Sweden  1996    2006  48.64  0.21 
Switzerland  1996    2007  43.00  0.14 
Taiwan, China  1994    2006  21.93  0.13 
Tanzania    2001    28.90  -0.13 
Thailand      2007  6.73  0.14 
Trinidad and Tobago      2006  33.72  0.09 
Turkey  1996    2007  23.19  0.16 
Uganda    2001    5.02  -0.04 
Ukraine  1996    2006  15.77  0.11 
United Kingdom      2006  33.94  0.18 
United States  1995  1999  2006  34.74  0.20 
Uruguay  1996    2006  10.11  0.08 
Venezuela, RB  1996  2000    21.40  0.14 
Vietnam    2001  2006  13.11  0.15 
Zambia      2007  15.34  0.16 
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